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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
 
_____________ 
 
No. 11-3588 
_____________ 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
 
v. 
 
DANNY TOLENTINO, 
a/k/a Dalmacio Tolentino, 
 
    Appellant 
 
_____________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of New Jersey 
(D.C. No. 2-09-cr-00484-002) 
District Judge: Hon. William J. Martini 
_____________ 
 
Submitted under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
June 22, 2012 
 
Before: AMBRO, VANASKIE and ALDISERT, Circuit Judges 
 
(Filed: July 5, 2012) 
_____________ 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
_____________ 
 
ALDISERT, Circuit Judge. 
In 2011 Dalmacio “Danny” Tolentino was found guilty of four drug trafficking 
charges and was sentenced to thirty-eight months‟ incarceration and five years‟ 
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supervised release. He appeals from the United States District Court for the District of 
New Jersey‟s final judgment. Tolentino‟s basic contention is that the District Court failed 
to raise the outrageous government conduct defense sua sponte, and that its failure 
constituted a violation of Appellant‟s rights assured by the Due Process Clause.   
 Because we write primarily for the parties, who are familiar with the facts and the 
proceedings in this case, we will revisit them only briefly.  
 In early 2007 Luis Fernando Arcila Fajardo, the government‟s confidential 
informant, introduced himself to Tolentino, the Appellant, at Tolentino‟s barbershop in 
Passaic, New Jersey. Arcila told Tolentino that he could smuggle drugs through the 
Newark airport but that he did not have access to any drugs, soliciting Tolentino‟s help. 
The two continued to see each other regularly at the barbershop, but the first time Arcila 
ever recorded one of their conversations was a year-and-a-half later.  
On June 25, 2009, Tolentino was charged with conspiring to distribute and possess 
with intent to distribute five kilograms or more of cocaine, to which he pled guilty on 
November 13, 2009. Tolentino subsequently sought to withdraw his plea. On December 
17, 2010, the District Court granted Tolentino‟s motion to withdraw. The government 
subsequently charged him with conspiring to import over five kilograms of cocaine, 
conspiring to distribute and possess with intent to distribute over five kilograms of 
cocaine, aiding in the importation of cocaine, and knowingly attempting to distribute and 
possess with intent to distribute over five kilograms of cocaine. 
Tolentino‟s conviction was based largely on the testimony of, and recordings 
made by Arcila, the government‟s confidential informant. During one of the recorded 
conversations, which took place on the same block as the barbershop, Tolentino can be 
heard discussing potential prices and buyers for drugs. Arcila testified also that Tolentino 
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introduced him to “Willy,” a person involved in the drug trafficking business who was 
able to purchase the drugs and arrange for their transport to the United States.  
From 2004 until 2011, Arcila was paid $60,000 as compensation for his work as a 
confidential informant, $12,000 of which was for his work on Tolentino‟s case. Federal 
authorities have deferred Arcila‟s deportation seven times since 2004, and have taken 
steps to prevent his mother and brother from being deported as well. The Department of 
Homeland Security has also sponsored an S-Visa application for Arcila, which will make 
it possible for him to gain permanent resident status in the United States, notwithstanding 
his past felony convictions.  
Tolentino presented a theory of entrapment at trial, which the jury rejected, finding 
him guilty on four drug trafficking counts. Tolentino moved for a judgment of acquittal, 
again arguing that he was entrapped. The Court denied this motion and eventually 
sentenced him to 38 months‟ imprisonment. Tolentino timely appealed.1   
II.  
The District Court had subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3231. 
We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We exercise plenary review on whether 
Tolentino waived the defense of outrageous government conduct at trial. See Rule 12 (e), 
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure; United States v. Pitt, 193 F.3d 751, 760-761 (3d 
Cir. 1999).  We review unraised claims for plain error. See Rule 52(b); Pitt, 193 F.3d at 
760.  
III. 
We conclude that Tolentino waived this defense of outrageous government 
conduct by not raising it before his trial began. Because Tolentino‟s claim would have 
                                              
1
 Tolentino did not raise the outrageous government conduct defense before or during his 
trial.  
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also failed on its merits, the District Court did not err when it failed to raise this defense 
sua sponte and dismiss Tolentino‟s charges. We will therefore affirm the District Court‟s 
judgment. 
A. 
An outrageous government conduct defense “examines whether a defendant‟s due 
process rights have been violated because the government created the crime for the sole 
purpose of obtaining a conviction.” Pitt, 193 F.3d at 759-760. The defense is “based on 
an alleged defect in the institution of the prosecution itself,” and is thus covered under 
Rule 12(b) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. Id. at 760. A defendant waives 
the ability to raise an outrageous government conduct defense if it is not raised before the 
trial begins. Because it is undisputed that Tolentino failed to raise this defense prior to his 
trial, we hold that he waived his right to bring it before us on appeal.  
Rule 12(e) contains an excuse of waiver if the defendant can show “good cause” 
for failing to make a timely 12(b) motion. United States v. Rose, 538 F.3d 175, 184-185. 
For example, we have held that a defendant did not waive his ability to raise an 
outrageous government conduct claim on appeal because “it may have been too late for 
[him] to make a Rule 12(b) motion when [he was] given the information [relating to the 
claim].” United States v. Gonzales, 927 F.2d 139, 144 (3d Cir. 1991). But an excuse of 
waiver should be granted only if “compliance with the procedural requirement [was] 
virtually impossible.” Pitt, 193 F.3d at 760. 
Tolentino has asserted no justification as to why he failed to raise this defense in a 
timely manner. Indeed, he provided the same facts here on appeal as he did for his 
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entrapment defense at trial. Tolentino has not only failed to address why it was 
impossible for him to file a 12(b) motion, but his brief fails to even argue that his wavier 
deserves excuse. Tolentino thus may not now use the waived claim as an end-run around 
his failed entrapment defense.  
B. 
Even if this defense were not waived, it would nonetheless fail. Although the 
defense of outrageous government conduct is “often invoked by defendants, [it] is rarely 
applied by courts.” United States v. Voigt, 89 F.3d 1050, 1065 (3d Cir. 1996) (citation 
omitted). “The pertinent question is whether the government‟s conduct was so outrageous 
or shocking that it amounted to a due process violation.” United States v. Christie, 624 
F.3d 558, 573(3d Cir. 2010) (citation omitted). “[C]ourts have experienced considerable 
difficulty in translating „outrageous misconduct‟ into a defined set of behavioral norms,” 
United States v. Nolan-Cooper, 155 F.3d 221, 230 (3d Cir. 1998) (citation omitted), but it 
is generally “reserved for only the most egregious circumstances,” United States v. 
Mosley, 965 F.2d 906, 910 (3d Cir. 1992). “[T]he challenged conduct must be shocking, 
outrageous, and clearly intolerable,” thus “violat[ing] our sense of fundamental fairness 
or shock[ing] the universal sense of justice.” Pitt, 193 F.3d at 761-762 (citing United 
States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 432 (1973)). “[W]e repeatedly have noted that we are 
„extremely hesitant to find law enforcement conduct so offensive that it violates the Due 
Process Clause.‟” United States v. Hoffecker, 530 F.3d 137, 154 (3d Cir. 2008) (quoting 
Voigt, 89 F.3d at 1065). 
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Tolentino contends that the government‟s conduct was outrageous because it 
incentivized its informant without supervising him, thereby allowing Arcila to persuade 
Tolentino to join a drug conspiracy. Even if there may have been something “shocking” 
about the incentives the government gave Arcila, Christie, 624 F.3d at 573, such an 
allegation would impugn the credibility of Arcila, not the behavior of the government, 
see Gonzales, 927 F.2d at 144 (“„[T]he method of payment is properly a matter for the 
jury to consider in weighing the credibility of the informant.‟” (quoting United States v. 
Hodge, 594 F.2d 1163, 1167 (7th Cir. 1979))).  During his trial, Tolentino had ample 
opportunity to cross-examine both Arcila and his supervisor regarding the informant‟s 
incentives and motivations. Hence, it is not our place to question the jury‟s finding that 
Arcila‟s testimony was credible.   
 Tolentino‟s contention that the government acted outrageously by not supervising 
its informant is also without merit. We have held that a lack of informant supervision 
does not constitute outrageous conduct. See Christie, 624 F.3d at 564-565 (holding that 
the government does not act outrageously in its supervision of a confidential informant 
even if that informant violates federal law by running a child pornography website). 
Arcila‟s supervisor testified, moreover, that the informant reported back “constantly” 
with status updates. App. 00055. He testified also that he was aware of Arcila‟s contact 
with Tolentino since the “beginning part of the summer of 2007.” Id. Although the lack 
of recordings during the first year-and-a-half of Arcila and Tolentino‟s acquaintanceship 
is troubling, as the District Court noted, the Appellant “points to no evidence showing 
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that [Arcila] did anything more than provide Defendant with an opportunity to commit a 
crime.” App. 00428.  
In United States v. Lakhani, 480 F.3d 171 (3d Cir. 2007), we held that a defendant 
had not met the rigorous standard of outrageous government conduct because he “used 
his own knowledge” of the illegal activity, and because “there [was] much to suggest” 
that the defendant was predisposed to criminal activity. Id. at 182. Unfortunately for 
Tolentino, his introduction of the confidential informant to “Willy,” someone the District 
Court found to be “clearly . . . involved in . . . the illegal business of importing drugs,” 
Supp. App. 458, established both that he used his own knowledge to further the drug 
trafficking conspiracy and suggests that he had a predisposition to commit the crime. 
Because Tolentino could not have met the requirements of the outrageous government 
conduct defense, the District Court did not err when it failed to raise it sua sponte during 
his trial. 
* * * * * 
We have considered all of the arguments advanced by the parties and conclude 
that no further discussion is necessary. The judgment of the District Court will be 
AFFIRMED.  
 
